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Abstract
In recent decades, populism has regained 
prominence in Latin America. It is expressed 
in forms of  government from left or right as it 
happens in Venezuela with Hugo Chávez and 
Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, as well as in mobili-
zation of  some sectors of  the population. 
This ambiguous concept takes on different 
meanings. From the economic point of  view, 
macroeconomic populism emphasizes growth 
through redistributive policies in the short 
term to increase consumption, neglecting 
macroeconomic balance, especially with regard 
to inflation and fiscal deficit.
This paper argues that macroeconomic popu-
lism is not new and has been applied in Latin 
America repeatedly. With some differences 
and at different times of  economic history, the 
governments of  Argentina, Chile, Peru and 
Venezuela, have resorted to the use of  fiscal, 
monetary and credit expansive policies and 
overvaluation of  the currency to accelerate 
growth and redistribute income. When applied 
there are concerns about fiscal and exchange 
restrictions.
The result is an uncontrollable inflation and an 
economic crisis, which may explain the instabi-
lity and hyperinflation that Latin America has 
experienced. Colombia, curiously, throughout 
its history, is an exception to this rule, due to the 
independence of  the institutions that manage 
monetary policy and the barriers that implies 
for the executive.
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EL PELIGRO DEL POPULISMO. 
POPULISMO MACROECONÓMICO 
EN AMÉRICA LATINA ¿COLOMBIA 
ES LA EXCEPCIÓN?
Resumen
En las últimas décadas, el populismo ha recu-
perado prominencia en América Latina. Se 
expresa en formas de gobierno de izquierda o 
derecha como sucede en Venezuela con Hugo 
Chávez y Álvaro Uribe en Colombia, así como 
en la movilización de algunos sectores de la 
población.
Este concepto ambiguo toma sobre diferentes 
significados. Desde el punto de vista econó-
mico, el populismo macroeconómico destaca 
el crecimiento mediante políticas de redistribu-
ción a corto plazo para aumentar el consumo, 
descuidando equilibrio macroeconómico, espe-
cialmente con respecto a la inflación y déficit 
fiscal.
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Este artículo sostiene que el populismo 
macroeconómico no es nuevo y se ha aplicado 
en América Latina en varias ocasiones. Con 
algunas diferencias y en distintos momentos de 
la historia económica, los gobiernos de Argen-
tina, Chile, Perú y Venezuela, han recurrido a 
la utilización de políticas fiscales, monetarias y 
crediticias expansivas y la sobrevaloración de la 
moneda para acelerar el crecimiento y redistri-
buir el ingreso. 
El resultado es una incontrolable inflación y 
una crisis económica, que pueden explicar la 
inestabilidad y la hiperinflación que América 
Latina ha experimentado. Colombia, curiosa-
mente, en toda su historia, es una excepción a 
esta regla, debido a la independencia de las ins-
tituciones que conducen la política monetaria y 
las barreras que implica para el ejecutivo.
Palabras clave
Populismo, populismo macroeconómico, 
política fiscal, política monetaria, política eco-
nómica, hiperinflación, hiperinflación clásica, 
inflación, fases del populismo macroeconó-
mico, estabilidad, América Latina, Argentina, 
Chile, Perú, Venezuela, Colombia.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade populism has once again 
come to the center of  the political scene in 
Latin America. It is expressed in two different 
ways. The first, is the traditional style expressed 
by the government, as in Venezuela with presi-
dent Hugo Chávez. The second way has origin 
in mobilization of  the population where might 
be a “latent populism” which could become 
evident when this population reach power. Two 
examples of  this type of  populism are the cases 
of  “Piqueteros” in Argentina and “Cocaleros” 
in Bolivia1. 
1 PINTO OCAMPO, Maria Teresa. Between 
Repression and Conciliation: the Growers in Chapare 
and Putumayo. Final Report of  the Contest: Social 
When we talk about populism we are faced with 
a very “ambiguous concept” which can be wide 
and inclusive2. It depends on what we want to 
emphasize. Then, from the point of  view of  the 
economy of  a country- which is the subject of  
this article- populism males emphasis on the 
growth by short term public policies of  redis-
tribution in order to growth the consumption. 
These impact the macroeconomics equilibrium, 
especially inflation and fiscal deficit. In this 
case we talk about macroeconomic populism3. 
There are some cases where the classic popu-
lism regime can apply economic decisions 
which benefit some people. There is a kind of  
“distributive microeconomic” which can be 
compatible with a “stable macroeconomic”. 
It could be the case of  Menem in Argentina 
or Fujimori in Perú4. But macroeconomic 
populism is not a new situation; it has been 
applied in Latin America in different periods5. 
Macroeconomic populism uses fiscal, mone-
tary and credit expansive policies and strong 
valuation of  the currency in order to accelerate 
the growth of  the economic and redistribute the 
income. These policies applied without fiscal 
and monetary restrictions and the result is high 
inflation and economic crises as has occurred 
in the next cases we are going to analyze in 
this article (Argentina, Chile and Peru). These 
cases prove that the populism is the cause of  
Movements and New Conflicts in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Regional Scholarship Program 
CLACSO. 2004. Available at: http://bibliotecavirtual.
clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/becas/2002/mov/pinto.pdf
2 Ibídem. 
3 DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. The Macroeconomics of  
Populism. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Mexico City. 
1997.
4 DEGREGORI, Carlos Iván. The Decade of  Anti-
politics: the Rise and Flight of  Alberto Fujimori and 
Vladimiro Montesinos / Carlos Ivan Degregori. 
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Lima. 2001.
5 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Grupo Editorial Norma. 
Bogotá. 2009. p. 33 y ss).
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the hyperinflation rule and it can be seen as a 
cause of  the hyperinflation and the macroeco-
nomic instability in Latin America6. Colombia, 
curiously some years ago was the exception to 
this rule. 
1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The term populism was originally used in the 
United States in the mid-1890s, referring to the 
People’s Party, but since almost no movement 
or leader has acknowledged being “populist.” 
In current political language, the term has a 
negative connotation, being closely associa-
ted with terms like “demagogia”, economic 
bounty, which indicate economic or political 
irresponsibility7. 
Populism is a controversial concept, and agree-
ments about what it means and who qualifies as 
a populist is difficult because politicians don’t 
want to identify with this analytical category8. 
With the economic crisis of  the late twentieth 
century, characterized by external shocks, 
among which are included the effects of  the 
Asian crisis and the Swiss bankruptcy9, the 
dynamism that characterized the economies of  
Latin America in the early years of  the nineties 
(except for Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay in 
1995) led to a stalemate. This period was called 
the “five years lost” by ECLAC.
Therefore, it rediscovered the importance of  
institutions as an essential framework for the 
proper functioning of  markets10. Above, it said 
to be the reason for the failure of  the Washing-
ton consensus led to discussion on the idea of  a 
shift to the left in Latin America.
6 Ibíd.
7 PANIZZA, Francisco. (Comp.). Populism as a Mirror 
of  Democracy. Fondo de Cultura Económica de 
Argentina. Buenos Aires. 2009. p. 9.
8 Ibídem.
9 Paramio, Ludolf. “Left turn and the return of  
populism”. In: Revista Nueva Sociedad. No. 205. p. 65
10 Ibíd. p. 66.
However, there was a divergence between poli-
tical discourse, the position on globalization 
and the interpretation of  democratic reforms 
and the role of  institutions11. The only coin-
cidence is the emphasis on social policy and 
the pursuit of  a focused economic model, not 
only in growth, but social outcomes, which has 
slowly degenerated into populism.
2. METHODOLOGY 
For this article, there will be a comparative 
exercise of  economic policy management, 
fiscal and monetary policy by the various 
governments in Latin America in order to 
identify the use of  economic tools for populist 
purposes. The selection of  countries is done 
arbitrarily and corresponds to the accessibility 
of  information on economic variables on 
the behavior of  fiscal and monetary policy. 
Similarly, we use simple graphic variables such 
as inflation, unemployment, gross domestic 
product, credit, etc, when available and at 
different times depending on the country for 
analysis. 
The idea is to study at the end the Colombian 
case and draw lessons that allow us to explain, 
first, the dangers of  macroeconomic populism; 
second, the relative economic stability 
experienced by Colombia in recent decades, in 
relation to neighboring countries.
3. THEORETICAL APPROXIMATION  
TO MACROECONOMIC POPULISM
3.1 Traditional European Hyperinflation 
and Populism Hyperinflations in Latin 
America
3.1.1 Traditional European Hyperinflation
The European economies had a hyperinflation 
process during the twenties in different countries 
(Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland and 
11 Ibídem
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Russia). The causes and consequences of  this 
phenomenon receive the name of  “traditional 
hyperinflation”12. The same phenomenon 
occurred in Latin America during the eighties 
in countries such as Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru; but exempting Bolivia in these 
countries the causes had a different nature to 
traditional hyperinflation13. 
After the experience of  the European countries, 
economists discussed different theories about 
the characteristics and effects of  traditional 
hyperinflation and the effective policies which 
where applied but resulted in being very expen-
sive for the society. Some years later some Latin 
– America countries were in the same situation 
as Europe had been, but the same policies did 
not function because they were applied in a 
very different context14. 
The origin of  traditional European 
hyperinflation obeyed to external factors. After 
the First World War, the European economies 
presented high budgets deficits which where 
financed by means of  the creation of  currency. 
In order to stop the hyperinflation, there was 
realized an orthodox program or global plan of  
stabilization, which generated credibility with 
the public and certainty that the Central Bank 
would not finance the budget deficit by issuing 
currency. 
The European countries that faced 
hyperinflation, the incomes only covered a 
small fraction of  the total expenses of  the 
country and the collapse in the public incomes 
coincided with the increase of  inflation (Olivera 
Tanzi Effect)15. In addition, the hyperinflation 
phenomenon was preceded by an excessive 
12 DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. The Macroeconomics of  
Populism. Ob. Cit.
13 Ibíd.
14 KRUGMAN, Paul. Economía Política internacional. 
Mac Graw Hill. 1997.
15 Ibíd. 
level inflation tax (seignior age]). Undoubtedly, 
the key components of  the integral programs of  
orthodox policies were:
•	 The policies of  stabilization that were 
adopted.
•	 The exchange rate which restored the conver-
tibility of  the domestic currency in terms of  
the dollar or of  the gold and the reduction of  
the budget deficit. 
The credibility of  the Central Bank is in the 
public eye when it promised to reject the 
demands of  the internal unsecured credits and 
not to grant any mores internal credit to the 
government16. 
3.1.2 Classical Populism as a Cause of 
Hyperinflation and Macroeconomic 
Instability in Latin America
Hyperinflation in Latin America, with the 
exception of  the Bolivian hyperinflation, 
-which presented traditional characteristics-, 
occurred in a very particular context. The 
characteristics of  the economies of  countries 
like Peru, Brazil and Argentina were economies 
following a tradition of  high inflation as a result 
of  macroeconomic populism17. The application 
of  populism policies creates high budget 
deficits due to increase in public spending 
(by the expansion of  government and state 
enterprises), as discussed below. It has been 
demonstrated that Latin America generally 
uses these policies: expansionary fiscal and 
expansionary credit policies and overvaluation 
of  the currency, in order to accelerate growth 
and redistribute income (macroeconomic 
populism). When the government applies them, 
there is concern about fiscal and exchange 
restrictions. After a while, decreasing real wages 
16 Ibíd. 
17 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
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Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Gross domestic product 
increased
Real wage growth
Employment growth
Inflation rate controlled
Import relieves the scarcity
Bottlenecks by:
•	 Strong demand growth
•	 Little foreign exchange 
(To pay for imports)
•	 Inflation Increases
•	 Wages unchanged 
•	 Increased subsidies
•	 Increased deficit
Causes:
•	 Capital flight
•	 Demonetization 
economic (barter)
•	 Fiscal deficit increase
•	 Subsidies decrease
•	 Inflation increase
•	 Real wages fall 
drastically
Government starts 
stabilization
 IMF Aid and BM 
declining real wages 
Control of  inflation rate
Break companies
The capital flight 
following the violent 
overthrow of  the 
government
and an imbalance in the balance of  payments, 
lead to hyperinflation18. 
Moreover, in each country the new anti-
inflationary programs coincided with the end 
of  a government and the beginning of  another. 
For this reason it is a new opportunity for 
macroeconomic populism to promise at the 
same time to reduce unemployment and to 
control inflation. As we know – ”Phillips’s 
Curve” teaches that it is not possible to achieve 
both aims in the short term19. 
This is an example of  application of  the Theory 
of  the “Economic - Political Cycle” which 
shows how the government does everything 
necessary to grow and to increase employment 
and the production of  the country in the short 
term by means of  increasing public spending, 
the external debt and the fiscal deficit20. These 
policies cause hyperinflations which could be 
handling by orthodox or heterodox policies 
which it will apply, on having finished its 
electoral period, or will remained a problem 
18 DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. The Macroeconomics of  
Populism. Ob. Cit.
19  MANKIW, N. Gregory. Principles of  Economy. Second 
edition. Mac Graw Hill. Translation by Esther 
Rabasco Espartiz and Luis Toharía Cortés. Madrid. 
2003. p. 474 .
20 Ibíd. p. 493.
to resolve for the following government. This 
is an example of  the macroeconomic populism 
as an important cause the big hyperinflations 
and of  the macroeconomic instability in Latin 
America. 
3.1.3 Phases of Macroeconomic Populism21
Rudiger Dornbusch says a populism policy 
progresses through these phases: (Chart N. 1)21
Then we are going to study each of  the proposed 
cases. 
4. RESULTS
4.1  Cases of Macroeconomic Populism 
In Latin America Chart 2. Cases of 
Macroeconomic Populism in Latin 
America22 
4.1.1 Argentina
In the early twentieth century, Argentina was 
considered one of  the world’s most developed 
21 Source: DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. The Macroeconomics 
of  Populism. Ob. Cit.
22 Source: MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution 
of  Economic and Social Policy in Latin America: A 
Comparative View. The University of  Texas at Austin. 
Institute of  Latin American Studies. Center for Latin 
American Social Policy (CLASPO). Researcher 
Visiting. Perú. February, 2004. p. 12.
Chart 1. Phases of Populism
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                   Country 
 Model Argentina Chile Perú Venezuela 
Liberal Primary 
Exporter
19 th – 1929
Constitutional 
governments
19 th – 1929
Constitutional 
governments
19 th – 1962
Militar 
governments
19 th – 1958
Autoritarian 
Governments 
Industrialization  
for Substitution of   
Imports ISI
1930-1990
José Félix Uriburu 
(1932)
1930-1970
Arturo Alessandri 
(1932)
1963-1985
Fernando Belaunde
Gral. Juan Velasco
Gral. Francisco 
Morales
1958-1974
Rómulo Betancourt
Raúl Leoni
Luis Herrera 
Campins
Macroeconomic 
Populism
Perón (1946-1955)
Perón II (1973-1976)
Military government 
(until 1983)
Raúl Alfonsin 
(Austral Plan)
Eduardo Frei 
Montalva 
(1964-1970)
Salvador Allende 
(1970-73)
Belaunde II
Alan García 
(1985-90) 
Jaime Lusinchi 
(1984-1989)
Hugo Chávez Frías 
(1999-present) 
Orthodoxy and  
Market economy
1991-2010
Carlos Menem
Fernando de la Rúa
Eduardo Duhalde
Néstor Kirchner 
Cristina Kirchner
1973-2004
Pinochet
Patricio Aylwin 
Eduardo Frei Ruíz
Ricardo Lagos
Michelle Bachelet
1990-2004
Fujimori
Valentín (interine)
Alejandro Toledo
Alan García
1974-1979
Carlos Andrés 
Pérez
1994-1999
Rafael Caldera
*This chart has been completed by the author of this article
countries. In 1890 its income per capita was 
the sixth highest in the world and continued 
among the top ten until 1920. From 1870-1930 
it experienced an average growth rate above 
5%, higher than almost all nations of  the world. 
During this period the country received several 
waves of  European immigration, mainly from 
Italy, attracted by the good living conditions23. 
This period was characterized by free trade, 
openness of  the economy to foreign, monetary 
and fiscal management well ordered and orderly 
23 MORA and ARAUJO, Manuel. “From Perón to 
Menem. A History of  Peronismo”. In: BORÓN, 
Atilio, et al. Peronismo and Menemismo. Populism in 
Argentina. El cielo por asalto. Buenos Aires. 1995.
succession of  constitutional government until 
the Coup d’etat of  September 6, 1930 by José 
Félix Uriburu. 
The effects of  the First World War and the 
Great Depression of  1929 led to a shift in 
development strategy. It began the era of  import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), which was 
applied during the twentieth century. In 1943, 
deposed President Ramón Castillo, began 
a turbulent period in the political history of  
Argentina. Since then, the country has had 
over 28 presidents. The election of  Coronel 
Juan Domingo Peron in 1946, consolidated 
the model of  state intervention in the economy, 
ushering in a period of  macroeconomic 
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populism. Perón tried to solve the problems of  
income inequality, through price controls and 
expansionary policies in state spending. These 
were financed through the inorganic issuance, 
which generated a problem of  inflation that 
would remain in Argentina for over thirty years 
Also Perón nationalized many businesses, 
passed legislation that favored labor unions 
and used public funds for the work benefactors 
of  the Foundation Eva Perón, led by his wife. 
Peron was deposed in 1955 and exiled during 
18 years until 1973, and his party, the Justicia-
lista Party, was forbidden to participate in the 
electoral process24. 
After a tumultuous period in which democratic 
governments alternated, Peron was re-elected 
and he took power in October 1973. He died 
in July of  the following year. His second wife 
while vice president, María Estela “Isabel” 
Martínez de Perón, succeeded him. Perón’s 
second government again used price controls 
and increased government spending as their 
tools of  social policy, as had happened almost 
twenty years before as a result of  unbalanced 
economy. 
In 1976 the Chief  of  the Army Commander, 
Jorge Rafael Videla led a new coup d´état. The 
military government remained in power until 
1983 and opted for a policy opposed to Perón´s 
policy. They developed a more liberal economic 
policy, opting for the opening of  the economy 
to foreign trade, price liberalization and fiscal 
austerity in social spending. After the populist 
government of  Juan and Isabel Perón, inflation 
edged 350% annually. The military government 
did nothing about it and contributed to the 
process with excessive spending during the 
Malvinas War25. 
24 Ibíd.
25 MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution of  Economic 
and Social Policy in Latin America: A Comparative View. 
Ob. Cit.
In 1983, inflation edged the 430% and assumed 
power after free elections, Raúl Alfonsin, he 
belonged to Radical Civic Union (UCR), the 
Peronist opposition party. The main problem 
for the government was to fight inflation and 
ran the Austral Plan, which required an austere 
fiscal and monetary performance, plus a tax 
reform to improve the financing of  expenditure. 
The plan ordered the freezing of  prices and 
utility rates and the regulation of  interest 
rates and the exchange rates. After a year of  
implementation, the monetary policy and price 
controls were relaxed. The latter attempt to 
control inflation was the Spring Plan, which 
was also unsuccessful: inflation marked a 
record 4923% in 198926. 
In this situation of  economic chaos, Carlos 
Saúl Menem, took over the government in 
1989. He was the Peronist and former governor 
of  La Rioja. His Peronist tradition was not in 
favor of  a heterodox shock policies needed to 
combat inflation and he spent a year without a 
fixed course. In 1990 inflation reached 1343% 
and the economy had remained stagnant from 
two decades ago, as the average annual growth 
during that period was less than 1%27. 
These facts forced the Argentine government 
to take drastic measures: after nearly twenty 
years of  inflation, it was thought that the only 
way to give confidence to staff  was through 
the “Austral Convertibility”, in relation to 1-1 
of  Argentina currency against the U.S. dollar. 
The only inflation in the economy would be 
imported from the United States. 
The plan achieved the goal of  ending inflation. 
In 1992, it was only 17% in 1993 was 7.4%, 
after 3.9% in 1994, and every year after that 
was below 2% until 200228. However, a system 
of  fixed exchange rate brought some economic 
26 MORA and ARAUJO, Manuel. “From Perón to 
Menem. A History of  Peronismo”. Ob. Cit. 
27 Ibíd. 
28 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
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challenges for Argentina. To maintain 
equivalence, its competitiveness should have 
evolved like the U.S., but this did not happen: 
the dollar rose against other leading currencies 
in the world and the peso came up, making 
the costs of  production in Argentina higher 
than in other countries, so that the country lost 
competitiveness29. 
Additionally, since amount of  resources issued 
depended only on the flow of  dollars, the 
country’s capital outflow caused interest rates 
to rise. This mechanism should again attract 
capital, but in the contexts of  Tequila and the 
Russian crisis (Paramio), they turned away 
from emerging markets fearing a repetition 
of  similar scenarios in other countries. These 
last two required immediate treatment, but 
the government sought reelection and did not 
allow it. Once again the populist strategies of  
the leaders are used to keep them in power.
Added to this was the lack of  flexibility in 
domestic prices. The syndicalist tradition and 
a strong regulated labor market hampered 
the flexibility of  wages to adjust the delay in 
competitiveness (real wages increased by 42% 
between 1990 and 1998).
But the biggest problem for the economy was 
Argentina’s external debt, correlated with the 
maintenance of  a high fiscal deficit throughout 
the nineties and the early years of  the new 
millennium. In 2001 the debt approached 150 
billion U.S. dollars. This figure corresponded to 
nearly 50% of  its GDP30. 
In 1999 the problem of  convertibility needed 
to be resolved. The Washington Consensus 
reforms suggested maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate and trade liberalization. Argen-
tina was in an impasse. If  devalued, would 
bankrupt many companies and would probably 
have to declare a moratorium on its debt. If  
Argentina did not devaluate, its debt would 
29 Ibíd.
30 Ibíd.
become more expensive. President Menem 
chose not to devalue, perhaps with the illusory 
hope of  getting re-elected a second time.
In late 1999, the government of  Fernando de 
la Rúa (UCR-Alliance Frepaso) started. This 
government opted to keep the convertible 
model, adjusting the fiscal situation and avoid 
new borrowing. It tried to give the necessary 
credibility to the government to encourage 
foreign capital in Argentina. The idea was to 
return this country by the path of  growth.
After months of  marches and counter marches, 
street protests, strikes, several letters of  intent 
signed with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and finally the straw that broke the 
camel´s back was the announcement of  the 
withdrawal limit for bank deposits to $ 250 per 
week (corralito). Fernando de la Rúa was forced 
to resign31. After three interim presidents that 
lasted just a few days in to government comes, 
allowing it to Eduardo Duhalde, who finally 
devalues the peso float freely against the dollar, 
plunging the country into a serious crisis, but 
necessary measure to stabilize at levels close to 
3 pesos dollar in late 2003. 
In 1999 De la Rua inherited a country with a 
delicate economic situation, a combination of  
high and rising public debt, a persistent fiscal 
deficit, high unemployment and rigidity in the 
exchange rate and monetary policy32. 
Between 1999 and 2001, the crisis in Argen-
tina was unsustainable. This triggered the 
largest financial collapse in recent history in 
Argentina, which led, inter alia, to the peso 
devaluation and a deflation33. To counter the 
crisis, President Fernando de la Rua, asked the 
International Monetary Fund resources and 
31 Ibíd. 
32 GERVASONI, Carlos. Political crisis política and 
financial crisis in the Aliances´ government in Argentina 
(1999-2001). 2010. Available On: http://repositories.
lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4090/
gervasoni.pdf ?sequence=2
33 Ibíd.
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increased its domestic debt. The result of  this 
policy was fatal for Argentinean debt, caused 
bankruptcy to the state at the end of  2001, and 
force to declare the public debt default. 
The political and economic crisis of  Argentina 
during the period 1999-2001, did not give the 
possibility to President Fernando de la Rúa to 
implement economic policies that would allow 
him to improve his image, making it clear that 
macroeconomic populism was not present in 
this government. 
De la Rúa resigned on 20 December. There 
were three interim presidents Ramón Puerta, 
Adolfo Rodríguez Saa and Eduardo Camano 
between December 20 to January 1st. A morato-
rium on payment of  external debt was declared 
on December 23, in an environment that was 
viewed internally and externally as a strong 
motivating populism.
On January 1, Congress elected Eduardo 
Duhalde, to complete the term of  de la Rua. 
The first days of  January 2002, the system finis-
hed collapsing with the Emergency Law and 
leaving the Convertibility law, establishing new 
restrictions on the removal of  deposits and the 
pesification of  dollar bank deposits34. 
From 2003 to 2007, Argentina experienced a 
phase of  economic growth with rates ranging 
around 9% in part due to a high dollar eco-
nomic policy designed to encourage import 
substitution, which increased the competitive-
ness of  industry in Argentina, This ended the 
crisis. Some economists argue that argentine 
inflation presented during the government of  
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Kirchner, is due 
to several factors, including growth in public 
spending, lower investment, expansion of  the 
monetary base by issuing pesos to finance 
public expenditure increases, among others. 
34 GUTIéRREZ, Ricardo Raúl. Argentine crisis at the end 
of  milenio. A teaching for Political Economie. Department 
of  economie. UNS. Ausgut, 2003. Available on: http://
www.aaep.org.ar/espa/anales/PDF_03/Gutierrez.
pdf
In the government of  Cristina Kirchner the 
global crisis affected the local economy. The 
costs could be contained by timely monetary 
expansion policy and public spending. Less 
income and more spending, a strategy to avoid 
higher social costs, resulted in a loss of  fiscal 
surplus. That surplus, which reached nearly 3.0 
points of  GDP in 2008, fell to a deficit of  0.4 in 
2009, according to private estimates35. 
Again, during the governments of  Nestor 
Kirchner and Cristina de Kirchner macroeco-
nomic populism was evident, as it used to 
appear. Expansive growth policies endangered 
economic stability, to the point of  hiding their 
effects through the manipulation of  inflation. 
4.1.2 Chile 
Historically, Chile has been characterized as 
one of  the countries of  greater political stability 
and democratic development in Latin America. 
During the twentieth century, in contrast with 
Perú and Argentina, Chile only suffered two 
military coups. The first was in 1932, but did not 
establish a military government and elections 
were held. The winner was Víctor Arturo 
Alessandri Palma. The second coup d´état was 
by Augusto Pinochet in 1973, deposing the then 
constitutional president Salvador Allende36. 
After the First World War, Chile was in a good 
economic situation. The government decided 
to develop a liberal model exporting mainly pri-
mary products generating the effect of  linkage 
with other sectors of  the economy. The Great 
Depression hit hard in Chile. The export sector 
collapsed with a crash and the Chilean economy 
was one of  the hardest hit in the world. After 
this experience, Chile’s development policy 
was oriented towards industrialization, the ISI 
35 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
36 MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution of  Economic 
and Social Policy in Latin America: A Comparative View. 
Ob. Cit.
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and increased state intervention. By the forties, 
both the State and the private sector played a 
business role.
However, in the fifties economists began to 
notice some of  the shortcomings in the import 
substitution model (ISI). Non-industrial sectors 
such as agriculture stagnated. It discourages 
the development of  new export products. The 
populist guidance of  some governments during 
this period fostered macroeconomic imbalan-
ces and started for the first time an inflationary 
process in 195537. 
In 1964 the government of  Eduardo Frei Mon-
talvo of  the Christian Democrats began. This 
government sought to stabilize inflation, indus-
trial modernization with the state as a source 
of  investment and establish social structural 
reforms such as land reform, nationalization of  
the copper and the development of  grassroots 
organizations to promote citizen participation. 
However, the antagonism of  the political 
parties prevented the formation of  a strong 
government and after six years of  government 
failed to meet the expectations, of  political 
and economic transformation generated in the 
population. 
Therefore, in 1970, the Chilean people opted 
for the socialist candidate of  Popular Unity 
(UP), Salvador Allende. This government was 
proclaimed anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic and 
antitrust. Its main objective was to strengthen 
the structural changes in the distribution of  
property. To achieve this should nationalize 
the means of  production and encourage greater 
participation38. Its main reforms were the natio-
nalization of  the country’s mineral resources, 
the nationalization of  large industrial enterpri-
ses, nationalization of  banks and the deepening 
of  land reform. 
37 Ibíd.
38 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit. p. 124.
From the macroeconomic point of  view, 
this government applied an expansionary 
fiscal policy by raising the salaries of  state 
employees, increasing the state apparatus and 
over-spending, and price controls. This policy 
can be categorized as populist and as such had 
no regard for macroeconomic balances.
This experiment ended as the other populist 
experiences in Latin America: fiscal deficit 
financed by Central Bank issues, hyperinflation 
and falling real wages, hurting the very people 
it tried to help. By 1972, inflation was already 
out of  control, reaching 206.5%, while for 
1973 reached 605.1%. Successive strikes desta-
bilized the government and the general chaos 
culminated in the coup led by General Augusto 
Pinochet39. 
The first two years of  the Pinochet government 
turned to control the macroeconomic imbalan-
ces left by Allende. In parallel, they established 
a market economic policy, a fairly pure neolibe-
ral model, with a sui generis property in Latin 
America: total autonomy to implement the 
policies it wishes. It eliminated price controls, 
tariffs were lowered dramatically to encourage 
imports, financial markets were liberalized and 
international capital flows were restructured 
and reduced public sector spending. Land 
reform was reversed and they began an aggres-
sive privatization process of  public enterprises.
Chile suffered terribly both economically and 
socially after the debt crisis of  1982. However, 
in 1984 Chile began a phase of  high economic 
growth which would largely reverse the ravages 
of  the crisis of  the early decade. In 1989, after 
losing the referendum to stay in power, Pino-
chet calls for free elections in March 1990 the 
“Government of  the Coalition of  Parties for 
Democracy” begins chaired by Patricio Aylwin 
of  the Christian Democrats, who took the deci-
sion not to change the historical direction of  
economic policy and gave priority to reducing 
39 Ibíd. p. 125.
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poverty and improving income distribution 
through active social policies40. 
This strategy was consolidating long-term 
development and supported by the growth and 
diversification of  exports, while reaffirming the 
importance of  maintaining macroeconomic 
balance through fiscal austerity.
This approach was vital for generating a climate 
of  institutional stability needed to generate 
private investment. This policy was followed by 
the governments of  Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tegla 
(1994-1999) and Ricardo Lagos (2000 - 2006). 
During the nineties, Chile grew at an average 
rate of  7% annually. This prosperity was reflec-
ted in the improvement in real wages, increased 
employment levels and falling poverty and 
destitution.
The government of  Michelle Bachelet was cha-
racterized by the high value of  copper resources. 
Chile decided to save these resources and was 
able to successfully address the systemic crisis 
that hit credit markets in developed countries41. 
For this reason, Chile was less affected, in con-
junction with other Latin American countries. 
Generating a fiscal surplus in 2008, allowed the 
State succeeds in accumulating financial resou-
rces which prevented the internal or external 
borrowing42. 
The economic measures taken in the handling 
of  the crisis for the government of  Michelle 
Bachelet, consisted of  adjustments to monetary 
and financial, fiscal and exchange rate policies 
and foreign trade43. 
40 Ibíd. p. 124.
41 CEPAL. Reaction of  Latin America governments to 
international crisis: a little presentation of  political measures 
announced from 30 june of  2009. División de Desarrollo 
Económico. Comisión Económica para América 
Latina. Santiago. 2009.
42 GARRETON, Manuel Antonio. Michelle Bachelet´s 
governent and Chilean Politic. ¿End of  political cycle?. 2010. 
Available on: http://www.manuelantoniogarreton.
cl/documentos/2010/gobierno_bachelet_es. pdf
43 Ibíd.
In relation to monetary and financial policies 
there were more facilities for the area of  foreign 
investment and the business sector, among other 
measures. Fiscal policy promoted measures 
investment and consumption. Exchange rate 
policy, foreign trade and foreign currency 
liquidity provided and improve coverage 
program of  bank loans to exporters44. 
In 2009, Chile’s risk rating by a rating agency 
changed from A2 to A1, placing it in the most 
favorable in the region45. 
As a result of  good macroeconomic 
performance, assessment and policy, in January 
2010, Chile became a member state of  the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
The economic policies implemented in the 
Bachelet government have been commensurate 
to the situation and have sought to generate 
sustainable economic stability, so there is no 
evidence of  macroeconomic populism in this 
government.
4.1.3 Perú 
Perú has been characterized by political 
instability. During the twentieth century 
occurred 8 coup d´état and ran 15 different 
military presidencies. The transition of  
democratic government in Perú is more 
the exception than the rule. The prevailing 
model of  economic development until 1962 
was a liberal and export model with mainly 
agricultural products (rice, sugar and cotton) 
and agribusiness46. 
44 CEPAL. Reaction of  Latin America governments to 
international crisis: a little presentation of  political measures 
announced from 30 june of  2009. Ob. Cit.
45 GARRETON, Manuel Antonio. Michelle Bachelet´s 
governent and Chilean Politic. ¿End of  political cycle?. Ob. 
Cit.
46 MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution of  Economic 
and Social Policy in Latin America: A Comparative View. 
Ob. Cit.
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However, the export sector is not articula-
ted with the national industry to produce 
value-added products, making the economy vul-
nerable to price changes. The high profitability 
in the export of  primary products was discou-
raged in order to invest in the industrial sector, 
while maintaining low tariffs and competitive 
prices for imported goods. Under this system, 
the input of  capital and profit repatriation is 
virtually unrestricted and state involvement and 
participation was minimal.
Between 1950 and 1962 the annual average 
fiscal deficit was -0.2% of  GDP, inflation was 
7.0% per year, GDP grew annually at a rate of  
5.3% and foreign debt amounted to U.S. $ 158 
million. However, the social situation was bad 
and was characterized by high concentration of  
income.
In 1962, more than 30 years after the start of  
the ISI in Argentina and Chile, the elected 
President Fernando Belaunde’s Popular Action 
party, began to implement this model. In this 
period were applied policies such as tariff  
increase for finished goods, fixed exchange 
rate, price controls, increased government 
investment in infrastructure, increased public 
spending, increasing foreign debt (which is 
necessary because of  a lack of  foreign exchange 
generated by the exchange rate appreciation) 
and the process began with land reform. 
However, these reforms did not have political 
consensus, especially from export sector which 
was directly affected.
The reforms were not considered radical. In 
October 1968, General Juan Velasco led a coup 
d´état. His model was an extreme version of  
the ISI and state intervention. He nationalized 
most international companies, maintained high 
tariffs on finish goods continued to increase 
fiscal expenditures through investment in 
infrastructure47. 
47 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
As a result, the fiscal deficit continued to 
increase, which was covered by foreign debt, also 
intensified the process of  agricultural reform, 
as farm ownership was highly concentrated. It 
is important to point out how. It was wrong for 
Perú land reform to be combined with the ISI, 
when much to these two incompatible policies 
dismantled the national productive apparatus. 
Agriculture went from 23% of  GDP in 1950 to 
only 15% in 1968. Paradoxically, Perú began to 
import food48. 
Velasco was in a precarious state of  health, 
while the nationalist model went into crisis. 
Popular discontent, manifested through several 
strikes and riots, were evident. Thus, in August 
1975, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez 
was proclaimed President of  the Republic.
During the period 1975-1980 he attempted 
to reverse some of  the measures of  Velasco, 
but not the reform or nationalization private 
enterprises. On the one hand, the government 
encouraged non-traditional exports through 
successive devaluations of  the currency (that 
generated inflation). The government tried, 
without success, repeated adjustments of  the 
fiscal and external debt, but they continued to 
increase. This period benefited from a rise in 
export prices of  metals.
In 1980, democracy returned to Perú and 
Fernando Belaunde, leader of  Popular Action, 
was elected. He organized a co-government 
with the Popular Party’s center-right Christian. 
The government applied a weird combination 
of  liberal politics to commerce populist in 
the macroeconomic. He continued external 
borrowing, which conditioned the rhetoric of  
economic policy. 
To get the credits of  International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the 
48 MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution of  Economic 
and Social Policy in Latin America: A Comparative View. 
Ob. Cit.
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government spoke of  reducing inflation and 
opening the economy, but in practice implemen-
ted an expansionary fiscal policy, increasing 
public investment beyond its means. This mea-
sure, coupled with small devaluations of  the 
exchange rate, meant that inflation remained 
above 70% during those years, reaching 158% 
in 198549. 
Income inequality, inherent since the inception 
of  the republic, had not been resolved. Thus, 
in the early eighties, subversive movements Sen-
dero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement (MRTA) were born and the govern-
ment failed to articulate a coherent strategy to 
overcome in its infancy.
In 1985, Alan García was elected. He represen-
ted APRA, the oldest party in Perú. APRA was 
a socialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary. 
This party decides to unilaterally declare a 
moratorium on foreign debt, a move that 
immediately isolated Perú from the internatio-
nal financial community.
García returned to the ISI and state interven-
tion through expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. Again applied price controls, increased 
tariffs on imports, prohibited a large number of  
commodities that could be manufactured in 
Perú. Alan García tried to control inflation by 
fixing the basic price of  the economy (such as 
gasoline and light), as the state owned produc-
tion companies). 
During the implementation of  populist model 
of  Alan García, the economy grew by 12.1% in 
1986 (due to expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies). The next year the economy heated 
up leading to the attempted nationalization of  
banking, in which entrepreneurs and investors 
lost confidence in the country50. 
49 AMERICAN BUREAU. The Poverty Brokers: The IMF 
and Latinoamerica. Ancora Editores. Bogotá. 1985.
50 MARCHESI, Giancarlo. The Evolution of  Economic 
and Social Policy in Latin America: A Comparative View. 
Ob. Cit.
By 1988, the fiscal deficit had reached 9.7% of  
GDP, while the product shrank by 9.4%. Alan 
Garcia never considered the possibility of  pur-
suing a policy shock like orthodox prices. If  the 
government had taken corrective measures in 
1987, when inflation was only 1145%, it could 
have avoided three years of  additional suffering 
for the people of  Perú. By 1988, inflation had 
climbed to 1722% and for 1989 was 2775%51. 
Phenomenon of  terrorism continued to rise, 
transforming a rural phenomenon to become 
urban. The long queues for food, strikes, and 
terrorist violence led to the Peruvian people to 
seek an alternative to the traditional parties.
At first, that alternative Mario Vargas Llosa 
represented the Libertad Movement, which is 
allied with the Popular Christian Party Acción 
Popular, two traditional parties which join to 
form the Frente Democrático (FREDEMO). 
Vargas Llosa government pursued a policy of  
“redistribution freezing” by decree the prices 
of  essential nutrients. When prices were deva-
lued traders kept the food and black markets 
emerged.
In 1990, the country welcomes Alberto Fuji-
mori as a new President of  the Republic. He 
decided to pursue a policy of  shock, as the only 
sensible measure. First, the prices rose dramati-
cally to their estimated real level and were then 
released from government control. 
At the same time, Fujimory applied a tight 
monetary policy, issuing only the essentials. 
The policy worked, as inflation went from a 
disastrous 7649% within 1990 to 139% during 
1991. In 1994, inflation was only 15%, and 
since 1997, Perú has had single digit inflation52. 
During the period 1990-1995, the government 
initiated a series of  reforms to transform the 
51 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
52 Ibíd.
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Peruvian economy into a market economy. It 
began an intensive process of  privatization, 
which favored an accumulated economic 
growth of  43% in the first seven years, the 
government decided to liberalize the trade and 
foreign capital investment and more flexible 
industrial relations.
After the coup d´état of  1992, Abimael Guzmán, 
Shining Path leader was captured, and in 1993 
Perú promulgated a new Constitution which 
allowed presidential reelection. Fujimori was 
re-elected, was to become a progressively 
authoritarian and corrupt leader. His third term 
lasted only three months because he had to flee 
to Japan, after the scandal of  the first video of  
Montesinos’s corruption network.
There followed a transitional government led 
by Valentin Paniagua, interim President elected 
by the Congress, who called elections, but the 
winner was Alejandro Toledo. Toledo assumes 
power in July 2001 and he continued the focus 
of  economy policy on the free market. 
The macroeconomic policy regime changed 
during the years 2000-2006. Adopting a 
monetary policy framework based on infla-
tion targeting reduced the cost of  money and 
improve the international competitiveness of  
Peruvian products53. 
The main problem faced by the Government 
of  Toledo was an excessively low inflation. In 
late 2001, core inflation was below 1.5%, while 
in the first quarter of  2002, inflation reached a 
record negative rate54. 
53 JIMENES, Felipe. 2007. Available on: http://
felixjimenez.blogspot.com/2007/05/por-qu-el-per-
sigue-creciendo.html. Consulted on 21/08/10
54 CUBA, Elmer. Evolution of  economie and political 
macroeconomie. An Analysis of  Alejandro Toledo 
government (2001-2003). Available on: http://www.
gestiopolis.com/canales5/eco/consorcio/eys52/
archivos/52-evolucion-economica-gobierno-toledo-
en-el-peru.pdf
In the last of  the Fujimori administration, the 
fiscal deficit was above the 3% of  GDP. The 
economic administration of  President Toledo 
strengthened the control over public finances, 
thus reducing the fiscal deficit to 2.5% of  
GDP in 2001, for which it including launched 
a package of  tax policies and administration, 
increasing the rate of  general sales tax. In the 
same period the public debt as a percentage of  
GDP fell from 46.1% to 38.0%55. 
The government of  Alan García implemented 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that 
explain the strong growth of  domestic demand 
in 2007. Increased demand led to an economic 
expansion and rice in imports. This generated 
a trade deficit and an increase in inflation and 
financial vulnerability of  the economy and loss 
of  credibility for the Central Bank. García used 
policies that show an apparent expansionary 
economic growth which was not sustainable, 
and ended up weakening and loosening the 
Peruvian economy56. 
4.1.4 Venezuela 
In 1998, six years after realizing an unsuccessful 
rebellious attempt against Carlos Andrés Pérez, 
the colonel Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was 
elected as President of  Venezuela. Since then 
his presidency has been defined as populist 
due to the different measures that including 
the following: very strong critic of  the gover-
nment of  United States, of  globalization and 
the market economy. During these years, the 
president has nationalized foreign companies, 
he has named his supporters in the Supreme 
Court, and he has implemented several pro-
grams directed to attending to the health of  
population while attacking the illiteracy of  the 
poorest population of  the country57. 
55 CIES. Dare to Fiscal Policy in Perú. Consorcio de 
Investigación Económica y Social. Lima. December 
of  2006. Available on: http://cies.org.pe/files/DyP/
dyp27.pdf
56 Ibíd.
57 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
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Equally, he has changed the constitution to 
allow his perpetual reelection. Chávez defines 
himself  as the standard-bearer of  the “Boli-
varian Revolution”58. Nevertheless, before 
Chávez, Venezuela had experienced already 
the characteristics of  populism. The populist 
history of  Venezuela, began in the middle of  
the eighties, in Jaime Lusinchi’s Presidency, 
when the fiscal deficit, the foreign debt, and the 
inflation increased in a substantial way.
Between 1989 and 1993, the president Carlos 
Andrés Pérez tried to restore the economic 
order, to reduce the inflation, and to adopt 
modern measures but they were weak. When 
Pérez assumed power, the foreign debt was 
enormous and out of  control, there was a shor-
tage of  food and credit had disappeared59. One 
of  the measures of  stronger shock implemented 
by Perez was a strong devaluation, which redu-
ced the value of  the bolivar by two thirds60. In 
three months, the price of  the public transport 
increased thirty per cent. 
As consequence of  the multiple disturbances 
caused by the dissatisfaction of  the population, 
this sad episode of  the Venezuelan history was 
known as the caracazo61 and resulted in the 
deaths of  more than 300 people in less than 5 
days62. 
One of  the major consequences of  the Caracazo, 
is the failed coup by Hugo Chávez in February 
1992 against the government of  Carlos Andrés 
58 RODRÍGUEZ, F. R. “An Empty Revolution: The 
Unfulfilled Promises of  Hugo Chávez.”. In: Foreign 
Affairs. 2008.
59 HAUSSMAN, Ricardo. “Impact of  Public Finances 
on Distribution”. In: INTERAMERICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK. Adjustment Policies and 
Poverty: False Dilemmas, Real Problems. Ed. José Nuñez 
del Arco. Washington, DC. 1995. p. 261.
60 Ibíd.
61 LÓPEZ, Margarita. “The Venezuelan Caracazo of  
1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness”. 
In: Journal of  Latinoamericando studies. 2003.
62 Ibíd.
Pérez, Though unsuccessful, Chávez was 
popular among the population, which then 
lead to the power. The Venezuelan people were 
convinced that corruption was the most serious 
problem facing the country and Chávez was 
seen at the time as a hero.
In 1993, Pérez was accused of  corruption and 
removed from his post by the Congress. In 
1994, Rafael Caldera, who had been President 
between 1969 and 1974 came to power thanks 
to a populist platform that was opposed to the 
reforms and to the globalization. 
His administration undid most of  the shy 
reforms implemented during the second period 
of  Carlos Andrés Pérez, realized in the frame 
of  the consensus of  Washington. In the first 
two years of  Caldera´s presidency, his admi-
nistration was characterized by rapid inflation, 
control of  prices, and fall of  the bolivar, bank 
crises and economic stagnation. 
In 1994 the government liberated Colonel 
Hugo Chávez from prison and signed an agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). In exchange for 1600 million dollars 
the government promised to reduce inflation 
and to reactivate growth, by a program of  the 
modernization of  the state and liberalization of  
the economy. 
When Chávez assumed the power in 1998, 
Venezuela was the country of  Latin America, 
which had implemented the least neoliberal 
reforms. For this reason is possible to affirm 
that Chávez is not a product of  the Consensus 
of  Washington. Chávez is a product of  the 
corruption, the economic stagnation and the 
complacency of  the Venezuelan elite63. 
During the first months of  his presidency, 
Hugo Chávez has taken important decisions 
to change the political and economic system in 
63 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
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Venezuela. In July 1999 he had established a 
Constituent Assembly. This Assembly appro-
ved a new constitution in December 1999. The 
new constitution made important changes: It 
changed the official name of  the country to the 
Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela, replaced the 
bicameral Congress by a single chamber, which 
increased the power of  the executive. Chávez 
also introduced changes in the system of  elec-
ting judges and promised free education and 
health and quality for Venezuelans64. 
Chávez’s economic policy had three objecti-
ves from the beginning: accelerate the rate of  
economic growth, provide social services and 
nationalize strategic companies65. Chávez 
removed the centralized Ministry of  family 
and social assistance in the Single Social Fund 
(FUS), administered by the military forces. 
Also Chávez´s government created various 
social programs called “missions” aimed at 
providing medical services to the poorest Vene-
zuelans. The government also implemented 
literacy campaigns and changes to improve the 
coverage and quality of  education66. 
The use of  these social programs for political 
purposes, “that since the political theory called 
the patronage”67, have been considered a favo-
rite tools of  populist politicians68. 
From 2002, public spending rose sharply and 
the central bank issued currency more easily. 
Accordingly, the official inflation rate was over 
30%, there was a price control and commodi-
ties became scarce69. 
64 CORRALES, Javier. “Hugo Boss”. In: Foreign Policy. 
January-February. 2006.
65 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America.Ob. Cit. p. 262.
66 Corrales, Javier. “Hugo Boss”. Ob. Cit.
67 WALKER, Ignacio “Democracy and Populism in 
Latin America.” In: Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies. Working Paper. 2009.
68 EDWARDS, S. (Ed.). Populism and Markets: The 
Dilemma of  Latin America. Ob. Cit.
69 Ibíd.
Despite these social policies, growth in Vene-
zuela has not been particularly significant in 
relation to the rest of  Latin American countries 
(3.5% on average between 1999 and 2007). In 
fact, some analysts attribute the entire Vene-
zuelan economic growth in this period to the 
increase in oil prices and the control exerted on 
the government oil sector by the government70 
but not to the success of  the social policies of  
the Chávez government. 
4.2  Colombia: why there has not been 
macroeconomic populism in our 
country?
As we have seen the countries of  Latin Ame-
rica went through this phase of  populism, with 
disastrous effects for the economy and welfare 
of  its inhabitants. We note how the countries 
have some economic and political memory, 
enabling them to learn from their mistakes. We 
should ask ourselves if  the populist political 
knowledge is absolutely untenable, or whether 
it can succeed. Colombia has hadn´t absence a 
populist policy in the last four decades.
Colombia has been perhaps the exception to the 
rule of  Latin American hyperinflation. In the 
last decades and until early 1990, Colombia has 
been characterized by macroeconomic stability, 
in contrast to the enormous volatility that other 
countries had in Latin America. 
This stability without doubt is given by eco-
nomic and political factors. On the one hand, 
economic stability generated by the coffee 
chains, led to unfavorable conditions for the 
emergence of  populist movements. 
Furthermore, the existence of  a consolidated 
system of  two political parties, contributed to 
an ideological convergence that has enabled the 
design and discussion of  economic policies in a 
non-ideologically polarized. This situation has 
70 RODRÍGUEZ, F. R. “An Empty Revolution: The 
Unfulfilled Promises of  Hugo Chávez”. Ob. Cit.
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hampered the introduction of  macroeconomic 
populism. This led during the twentieth century 
the Colombian economy was one of  the few 
economies in Latin America who never had 
hyperinflation.
The Evolution of  the Central Bank in Colom-
bia has also been identified as one of  the key 
elements of  macroeconomic stability71. 
In 1923 Colombian created the Bank of  the 
Republic, because the country needed an ins-
titution to put order to the issuance process, 
following the crisis of  1922. With the help of  
the Kemmerer mission was established by Act 
25 of  1923, the Organic Statute of  the Bank of  
the Republic, which gave exclusive authority to 
issue legal tender, managing foreign reserves 
and acting as lender to the government, but only 
when necessary. In 1951 Kemmerer mission 
designed the monetary, credit and exchange 
policies72. 
1963 marked another important point in the 
evolution of  the Colombian Central Bank, 
because government created the Monetary 
Board, which became independent come 
the conduct of  monetary policy, credit and 
exchange policies of  private actors (which 
previously were part of  the Board Directors of  
the Bank of  the Republic). It also consolidated 
the Banking Superintendency how the financial 
system watchdog73. 
In 1973, the Bank of  the Republic became a 
financial public entity and in 1982 became an 
economic public entity, unique in nature, with 
special administrative arrangements, legal 
and independent assets. With the Issue of  the 
Constitution of  1991, the Bank of  the Republic 
rose to constitutional status and also to over 
71 BANK OF THE REPUBLIC. Introduction to Economic 
Analysis: the Colombian Case. Second Edition. Bogotá. 
1998.
72  Ibíd. p. 164.
73  Ibíd. p. 171.
the management of  monetary policy and the 
inflation control74. 
This independence of  the Central Bank has 
encouraged the control of  inflation, even at the 
expense of  jobs and demand, and according to 
some of  democracy itself.
Regarding the latter argument, it should be 
noted that the independence of  central banks, 
driving away the temptation of  populist as a 
tool as powerful as monetary policy, as submit-
ted to the control of  the Congress, academia, 
local financial markets and international public 
opinion.
In Colombia, during the government of  Alvaro 
Uribe Vélez, the Democratic Security policy 
proposed by his government, resulted in feelings 
of  security and confidence for the majority of  
Colombian citizens, increasing the president’s 
popularity ratings. 
However, in his management of  economic 
policy, it is possible to observe some features 
of  populism. With the aim of  increasing the 
fighting forces, the Democratic Security Tax 
was established in 2001, which raised 2.5 
billion pesos in order to close the budget gap for 
2002 law enforcement and fund the so-called 
“Emergency Plan” in 200375, which consisted 
in increasing the forces manpower both rural 
and urban. 
Some of  the fiscal policy measures implemented 
during the government of  President Uribe were: 
in 2002 he established the transitional tax assets 
through the law of  internal disturbance. The 
government proposed a process of  adjustment 
and austerity by announcing cut public 
74 GÓMEZ ARRUBLA, Fabio. History of  the Bank of  the 
Republic. Bank of  the Republic. Bogotá. 1983.
75 VELÁSQUEZ VARGAS, A, et al. “Public Safety and 
Public Expenditure: Reflections on the Colombian 
Case”. In: Latin America Today Magazine. Vol 50. 
2008. University of  Salamanca, Spain. Available 
http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/src/inicio/ArtPdfRed.
jsp?iCve=30810929003
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spending by 1.5 billion pesos, as a result of  the 
fiscal deficit of  3.3 percent of  GDP in 2008.
Similarly, and in order to obtain more 
resources major state enterprises were 
privatized76. Despite the announced austerity, 
the government increased its social spending 
programs such as investing in action families 
Familias en Acción, the expansion of  subsidized 
health system, the new target population of  
the ICBF, breakfasts for children, protection 
for the elderly, increased training of  the Sena, 
reducing unemployment, promoting micro-
credit, the impetus to housing for the poor 
and increasing social investment77, indicating 
that despite the high fiscal deficit, government 
spending continued to increase in military 
manpower and welfare policies without much 
impact on the welfare of  society. 
Unemployment had a small reduction from 
2002 to 2007. However it increased from 2008 
(see Chart 6). This increase may be associated 
with the effect of  the global crisis on our 
country, taking into account the high degree of  
dependence of  the Colombian economy on the 
U.S. economy. 
During his first term of  office, the Uribe 
government managed to maintain a certain 
economic stability to get through a fiscal policy 
strategy, which meant significant increases in 
public spending. However, during his second 
administration, this economic growth was 
affected by the revaluation and low employment 
generation. It is necessary to note that the 
early years coincided with the expansion of  
the global economy. However, in the efforts to 
achieve re-election and other political factors 
led the Uribe government to “leave aside” 
the economic issue. This led him to be less 
competitive in the second period. 
76 Ibíd.
77 PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC. Website www.
presidencia.gov.co
Monetary policy during the government 
of  President Uribe led by the Bank of  the 
Republic, was focused on continuing the system 
of  inflation targeting. To this end, the Bank of  
the Republic used measures such as increasing 
the base rate and increases in bank reserves, 
among others. The reduction of  inflation has 
significantly increased trust in the Colombian 
economy. (See Chart 7). 
It is possible to conclude that some features 
of  the phenomenon called macroeconomic 
populism were present during the 
administration of  President Uribe. He made 
use of  economic policy to develop programs 
that allowed him to have a good national 
image, especially with the most vulnerable 
population, thus hiding the poor economic 
performance and serious problems of  
corruption within their government.
However, Colombia did not experience, like 
other Latin American countries at the time, 
the terrible consequences of  macroeconomic 
populism. The strength of  the institutions 
to which the Constitution had assigned the 
management of  economic and fiscal policy 
and the control to prevent to use these tools in 
an irresponsible way by the executive, coupled 
with the traditional central bank independence, 
explains this situation. 
Of  course, many other factors contributed to 
the economic stability of  Colombia in the Latin 
American context. Among these factors are the 
coffee boom and the boom of  drug trafficking. 
All of  these factors led the Colombian economy 
to be of  populist management. It never had 
hyperinflation, and the country experienced 
the greatest macroeconomic stability in Latin 
America in the last sixty years. 
CONCLUSIONS
Four of  the five economies studied: Argentina, 
Chile, Perú and Venezuela have suffered the 
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delay of  the import substitution model and 
the inflationary problems of  populist policies. 
The exception is that Belaunde and Velasco 
did twenty years after knowing that it had not 
worked in Peron’s Argentina.
Velasquismo inspired socialist Allende and 
Allende inspired García, 12 years after learning 
that this model had failed in Chile. It is hard to 
understand the logic of  repeating failed expe-
riences in dogmatic convictions.
We should, in light of  what has been studied in 
the five cases presented, reflect on some lessons 
that I think are important: The first lesson is the 
importance of  having a good economy policy 
to allow a strong social policy. Improving the 
quality of  life of  people, it is almost impossible 
in a context of  recession or negative growth.
The time needed to generate revenue and qua-
lity jobs in an economy is more than the speed 
with which these jobs are lost in times of  crisis. 
That is, the impact of  the crisis is always greater 
than the impact of  the expansions. Therefore, 
generating a long-term sustained growth is a 
necessary but not enough to improve the qua-
lity of  life of  the population.
The second lesson is that one should not avoid 
a necessary and inevitable adjustment for 
political reasons, because if  the adjustment 
is postponed, the treatment will end up being 
worse than the disease. Postponing the devalua-
tion caused three years of  additional suffering 
to the people of  Argentina, and likewise for the 
Peruvians, who watched as little by little the 
quality of  life was deteriorating.
Colombia is the exception to the rule of  
macroeconomic populism in Latin America. 
Different factors set out below (coffee stability, 
bipartisan consensus, macroeconomic policies, 
central bank independence, etc.) have never 
contributed to hyperinflation, and to maintai-
ned macroeconomic stability.
However, the absence of  populism does not 
imply that there were always chosen to sound 
policies, at least on social issues on the poverty 
levels. In conclusion, macroeconomic popu-
lism was extremely harmful to the welfare of  
the countries studied and Colombia was the 
exception to the rule.
GRAPHS 
Graph 1. Total foreign debt 
Graph 2. Social policies - public spending
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
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Graph 3. Inflation
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Graph 4. Gross domestic product
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Graph 5. Variation gross domestic product
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
 Graph 6. Unemployment rate of Colombia
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América 
Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with database 
available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.
asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Graph 7. Annual inflation in Colombia 
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